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Policy makers as well as taxpayers are interested in comparing the tax burden in their 
countries with others, particularly given the wide variations in taxation levels and policies. In 
order to assess the heterogeneous national tax systems on a fully comparable basis, it is 
essential to have a unified statistical framework. This paper presents key trends in the tax 
burden in the Member States of the European Union, based on the European Commission's 
report 'Taxation trends in the European Union' The main focus lies on analysing the tax 
burden by economic function (i.e. consumption, labour and capital). The paper presents the 
methodology that is applied in order to allocate the tax revenue of the different taxes to the 
economic functions. Moreover, we present measures for the average effective tax burden on 
different types of income or activities, the so-called implicit tax rates. Results of the 
calculations are presented looking both at differences between Member States and trends over 
time.  
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1. Introduction 
Taxation is at the heart of citizens' relationship with the State. Taxpayers as well as politicians 
are interested in the development of the overall tax burden overtime and the question how 
their respective country compares to others. For these analyses an unbiased reference in the 
debate on taxation in Europe, which allows full cross-country comparability, is of importance. 
The European System of National and Regional Accounts ESA 95, which contains data on tax 
revenues and revenues from social security contributions, provides such a reference.  
This paper is based on the report 'Taxation trends in the European Union: Data for EU 
Member States and Norway' (see European Commission, 2008a)1, which contains an analysis 
of trends in the tax burden over time and a comparison among EU Member States. The paper 
also presents a classification of the tax structure by economic function (i.e. labour, 
consumption and capital) and measures for the average effective tax burden on different types 
of income or activities. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology for 
the analysis of the overall tax burden, the revenue structure by type of tax and by level of 
government as well as the respective key results for the 1995-2006 period. Section 3 explains 
the methodology applied for the classification of the tax burden according to economic 
function and analyses the results. In section 4, the concept of the so-called implicit tax rates, 
measuring the effective tax burden on different types of economic income or activities, is 
explained. Moreover, results are presented. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
1 An international comparison of tax revenues is also published by the OECD (see OECD, 2008a), containing 
data for the OECD member countries. In contrast to European Commission (2008a) and this paper, the OECD 
does not strictly follow the system of national accounts in their calculations. 
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2. Measurement of the overall tax burden  
2.1  Methodology 
The data presented are computed on the basis of a methodology allowing full cross-country 
comparability. The methodology is based on the European System of National and Regional 
Accounts (ESA 95)2. The results presented in this part are available in the Eurostat database3. 
Directly using the information on tax revenue contained in ESA95, the Member States can be 
compared as regards the overall tax-to-GDP ratio, the structure of taxation by type of tax 
(direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions) as well as by level of 
government. Moreover, the developments over time can be analysed.  
Before looking at the disaggregation of the overall tax burden, it is important to clarify what is 
contained in the definition of the overall tax burden used in this paper. The definition applied 
in this paper, which is based on the ESA95 classification, is presented in Table I:4 
Table I – Total Taxes (incl. compulsory social security contributions) 5 
   D.2 Taxes on production and imports 
+ D.5 Current taxes on income, wealth, etc.  
+ D.91 Capital Taxes 
+ D.6111 Actual social contributions  
    -    D.61112  Voluntary employers' actual social contributions 
    -    D.61122  Voluntary employees' actual social contributions 
    -    D.61132  Voluntary contributions by self and non-employed persons 
(- D.995  Capital transfers from general government to relevant sectors representing  
  taxes and social contributions assessed but unlikely to be collected 
 
It is in particular important to note that in the definition of the overall tax burden applied here, 
taxes and compulsory actual social contributions are included. Whereas taxes can be defined 
as unrequited, compulsory payments levied by general government (or by the Institutions of 
the European Union), compulsory social contributions are in general not unrequited as they at 
                                                 
2 See Eurostat (1996) for a detailed description of ESA95 system. 
3http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&scree
n=welcomeref&open=/data/economy/gov/gov_a&language=en&product=EU_MAIN_TREE&root=EU_MAIN_
TREE&scrollto=0, section 'Main national accounts tax aggregates'. The data can also be found in European 
Commission (2008a) or accessed via the following webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/taxtrends. 
4 Note that Eurostat also publishes data on the overall tax-to-GDP ratio using a slightly broader definition of 
overall tax revenues, which also includes voluntary (D.61112, D. 61122, D. 61132) and imputed social 
contributions (D. 612) (see Eurostat, 2008). The difference between the two measures amounts to around 1½ % 
of GDP on the European Average and is quite stable over time. 
 4 
least to some extent allow access to potential future services (as in the case of the health 
insurance) or future payments (as in the case of the old-age insurance).6 Compulsory actual 
social contributions are included the definition of the overall tax burden used here, as – at 
least in many cases – the value of the services provided is not or not directly linked to the 
level of social contribution payment. They do therefore often have a tax-like character.7  
Another question that is often subject to discussion is, in how far fees etc. are included in the 
definition of total taxes. Following ESA95, payments for licences etc. are only included in the 
tax revenues if they are paid by households for the use of vehicles, boats or aircraft, or 
licences to hunt, shoot or fish or by enterprises for business and professional licences that are 
automatically granted on payment of the amount due. Other licences are only treated as taxes 
in so far as the amount charged for the licence is 'clearly out of all proportion to the cost of 
providing the services'.8 
The probably most common way to classify tax revenues is the distinction of indirect taxes, 
direct taxes and social contributions. The terms as such are not used in the ESA95 system, in 
which taxes are identified according to their purpose (see Table 1). The groups are defined in 
the following way:9 
• In general terms, indirect taxes are all taxes levied on the production or consumption 
of goods and services as well as on transactions. They are defined as the sum of the 
taxes in D.2 of the ESA95 system.  
• Direct taxes are typically based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay as measured by 
income and wealth. In the definition used here they include current taxes on income 
and wealth (D.5) and capital taxes including taxes such as the inheritance and gift 
taxes (D.91).  
• Social (security) contributions include payments made in respect of insurance against 
social risks or needs. As used in this paper, they include actual compulsory 
contributions paid by employers (D.61111), employees (D.61121) and self- and non-
employed (D.61131).  
                                                                                                                                                        
5 A detailed list of the ESA95 classification of taxes and social contributions is presented in the Annex. 
6  Data for total taxes (excluding social contributions) is also published (see European Commission, 2008a) and 
regularly referred to in some Member States (see Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2008). 
7 For a discussion of the tax-like character of social security contributions see Elschner et al. (2006). 
8  See Eurostat (1996) for a detailed discussion. 
9  Definitions used in the Member States might deviate from the one used here. 
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Finally, the tax level is often split by the level of government ultimately receiving it. In the 
ESA95 framework, the sector general government (S.13) includes four levels: the central 
government (S.1311), the state (region) for federal states (S.1312), local governments 
(S.1313) and social security funds (S.1314). The overall tax revenues also includes tax 
revenues received by the EU institutions (S.212).  
2.2  Results 
Graph I illustrates the important variations in tax burden within the European Union. A 
difference of more than twenty percentage points can be noticed between Denmark, where the 
tax burden was the highest in 2006, and Romania, where the tax burden is the lowest. In 2006, 
the arithmetic average of total tax-to-GDP ratio reached 37,1% in the EU 27 or about ten 
points of percentage higher than the corresponding ratio in the US or Japan. The average tax 
burden in the EU 25 increased between 1995 and 1999 by 0.5 percentage point (arithmetic 
average) and 1.4 percentage points (GDP-weighted average). The trend reversed during the 
period 2000-2003. A significant increase was again noticed in 2005 and 2006, bringing the 
indicators close to their initial values. Large Member States have increased tax burdens more 
than small Member States.  
Graph I - Total tax burden (incl. social contributions) 
2006, in % of GDP, arithmetic averages 
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Graph II displays the changes in the tax-to-GDP ratios between 1995 and 2006 in percentage 
points of GDP, in comparison to the original levels in the base year 1995. The top half 
includes those Member States which have seen their overall tax ratio increase since 1995, 
while the right-left dimension identifies the starting point at the beginning of the decade 
compared with the 1995 mean; that is, countries that at the beginning of the period displayed 
higher-than-average total tax ratios are in the right half and vice versa. The Member States in 
the upper-left quadrant, e.g. had a tax-to-GDP ratio below the EU-25 average in 1995, but 
have increased the ratio in the 1995-2006 period. 
Graph II - Changes in total tax burden 
1995-2006, in % 
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Source: Commission Services 
As can be seen from Graph II, more Member States have increased their tax ratios (14) than 
reduced it (11). The left part of the graph displays more important changes: Member States 
witnessing a lower than average tax burden in 1995 have more frequently carried out 
significant policy changes. Cyprus and Malta have increased their tax-to-GDP ratio 
respectively by 9.9 and 7 points of percentage while Slovakia and Estonia have reduced it by 
10.9 and 6.7 points. Among the 11 Member States which had a lower tax-to-GDP ratio in 
2006 than in 1995, 6 have joined the EU in 2004. The tax-to-GDP ratio has increased in 
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several large Member States: by 3.8 points of percentage in Spain, 2.2 in Italy and the UK and 
1.5 in France. 
Graph III displays for the EU-27 the broadly similar shares of revenues raised from direct, 
indirect and social contributions. However, individual Member States have very different 
structures according to the type of tax. New Member States tend to rely to a smaller extent on 
direct taxation. Direct taxes only account for around 20 % of total revenues in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovakia while they represent more than 60% in Denmark. The share of indirect 
taxes varies from 30% in the Czech Republic and Belgium to 56.5% in Bulgaria. Social 
contributions only bring 2% of total revenues in Denmark, but 44% in the Czech Republic.  
Graph III - Revenue by major type of tax 
EU-27, weighted averages, 2006 
Social 
contributions
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Source: Commission Services 
The developments between 1995 and 2006 in the tax-to-GDP ratios for the different taxes are 
illustrated in Graph IV (the black line represents the sum of the changes of the different 
components as a percent of % GDP). The structure has remained broadly unchanged at the 
level of the EU–25 for which data is available for the whole period considered. Much more 
change can be noticed at the level of individual Member States. The Czech Republic and 
Poland have decreased taxes and increased social contributions while France, Slovenia, Latvia 
and the Netherlands have implemented opposite reforms. Some Member States have also 
increased or reduced all types of revenues as exemplified by Slovakia and Cyprus and 
Slovakia at both ends of the graph.  
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Graph IV - Evolution by major type of taxes 
1995-2006, differences in % of GDP 
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Source: Commission Services 
Note: Romania and Bulgaria are not included as no data is available for a substantial part of the time series. 
State or sub-federal Governments only exist in part of the Member States (Austria, Belgium, 
Spain, Germany). As illustrated in Graph V, their share of revenues has increased 
significantly during the period 1995-2006. Spain has in particular witnessed in 2002 an 
increase of more than 10 percent of total taxes of the share of taxes collected by state 
governments. Smaller developments are noticed as far as local governments are concerned. 
Revenues of local governments have increased in relation to GDP in Romania, Slovakia and 
Italy while a decrease took place in Bulgaria.   
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Graph V - Share of total tax revenue: local and state government 
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Note: Averages of Member States with respective level of government 
Source: Commission Services 
3. Distribution of the tax burden according to economic function 
3.1 Methodology 
The interpretation of the tax-to-GDP ratio as an indicator for the tax burden requires 
additional information. In order to have a better picture of the tax burden, an economic 
classification of taxes is presented. Taxes are classified as taxes on consumption, labour and 
capital. In the case of labour and capital a more detailed breakdown is available (see below). 
The classification refers to the question on which kind of economic income or activity a tax is 
levied. It does, however, not reflect the final economic incidence of a tax which might be 
different. The economic classification of taxes is not standard and is computed specifically for 
the publication 'Taxation trends in the European Union' (European Commission, 2008a). It 
has been developed jointly by statisticians from Eurostat and economists from the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Taxation and the Customs Union.10 They were 
                                                 
10 The methodology has already been applied in several editions of the report 'Structures of the tax systems in the 
European Union', which is the predecessor of the report 'Taxation trends in the European Union'. 
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supported in this task by the national Statistical Offices and the Ministries of Finance of all 
countries covered.11 
For the analysis more detailed tax revenue data provided by the Member States is used. In this 
part of the paper, the general rules used for the allocation of the taxes will be presented. It will 
be explained which ESA95 subcategories are, as a rule, allocated to which economic function. 
In several cases, however, the real classification of a tax deviates from the standard 
classification if the true nature of a tax requires it. Moreover, some taxes are not imposed on 
one economic activity but the revenues relate to multiple sources of economic income. This 
holds most notably for the personal income tax. In these cases, the revenue from a tax is split 
between several economic classifications. In the case of the personal income tax, a so-called 
PIT-split is calculated by the Member States authorities, which breaks down the tax revenue 
into four sources of taxable income: labour (employed), capital, self-employment income, and 
social transfers and pensions (labour non-employed) according to a country specific 
methodology. Depending on the data availability in a Member State, different methods are 
applied: the calculations are either based on 'data-sets for individual taxpayers', 'income class 
data based on data-sets of individual taxpayers' or 'tax receipts data from withholding- and 
income tax statistics'.  
In the following we will focus on the general rules applied for the classification of taxes and 
not on the discussion of borderline cases. Taxes on consumption are defined as taxes levied 
on final consumption goods. The following categories of the ESA95 classification are 
considered as taxes on consumption: 
                                                 
11For a detailed discussion of the methodology see also European Commission (2008a, Annex C). 
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Table 2 – Taxes on Consumption 
D.211 Value added type taxes 
D.212 Taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT 
D.214 Taxes on products except VAT and import duties less 
D.214b Stamp taxes 
D.214c Taxes on financial and capital transactions 
From D.29 Other taxes on production: 
D.29d Taxes on international transactions 
D.29f Taxes on pollution 
D.29g Under-compensation of VAT (flat rate system) 
From D.59 Other current taxes: 
D.59b  Poll taxes 
D.59c  Expenditure taxes 
D.59d Payments by households for licences 
 
Taxes on labour comprise of taxes on labour employed and on non-employed labour (i.e. 
transfer income). Taxes on employed labour include all taxes, which are directly linked to 
wages and mostly withheld at source. Both taxes paid by employers and employees are 
counted, including compulsory actual social contributions (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 – Taxes on labour employed 
From D.51  Taxes on income: 
D.51a+D.51c1  Taxes on individual or household income including holding gains (part raised on 
labour income) 
From D.29 Other current taxes: 
D.29c  Total wage bill and payroll taxes 
From D.611  Actual social contributions: 
D.61111  Compulsory employers' actual social contributions 
D.61121  Compulsory employees' actual social contributions 
 
Under the definition of taxes on employed labour income adopted here, the categories 
'personal income tax' and 'social security contributions' are used in a wide sense. They also 
include other taxes that are felt to increase the cost of labour, such as payroll taxes or specific 
surcharges on the personal income tax levied in some Member States.  
 
Taxes on labour-non employed (see Table 4) include all those taxes and compulsory social 
security contributions imposed on the transfer income of the non-employed. Transfers 
comprise social transfer payments by the state (e.g. unemployment- or health care benefits) 
and benefits from old-age pension schemes (both state and occupational pension schemes). 
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This can be justified by the fact that most of the transfers paid to non-employed people are 
somewhat linked to previous employment. 
 
Table 4 – Taxes on labour non-employed 
From D.51  Taxes on income: 
D.51a+D.51c1  Taxes on individual or household income including holding gains (part raised 
on social transfers and pensions) 
From D.611 Actual contributions: 
D.61131 Compulsory social contributions by self- and non-employed persons (part paid by 
social transfer recipients) 
  
 
Taxes on capital include taxes imposed on capital and business income in a broad sense (see 
Table 5) as well as taxes on the stock of capital (wealth) or the transfer of capital (see 
Table 6). 
Table 5 – Taxes on capital and business income 
From D.51 Taxes on income: 
D.51a+D.51c1 Taxes on individual or household income including holding gains (part 
paid on capital and self-employed income) 
D.51b+D.51c2 Taxes on the income or profits of corporations including holding gains 
D.51c3 Other taxes on holding gains 
D.51d Taxes on winnings from lottery and gambling 
D.51e Other taxes on income n.e.c. 
From D.611- Actual social contributions: 
D.61131 Compulsory social contributions by self- and non-employed persons (part 
paid by self-employed) 
 
Table 6 – Taxes on stocks (wealth) 
From D.214 Taxes on products, except VAT and import taxes: 
D.214b Stamp taxes 
D.214c Taxes on financial and capital transactions 
From D.29- Other taxes on production: 
D.29a Taxes on land, buildings or other structures 
D.29b  Taxes on the use of fixed assets 
D.29e Business and professional licenses 
D.29h Other taxes on production n.e.c. 
From D.59 Other current taxes: 
D.59a Current taxes on capital 
D.59f Other current taxes on capital n.e.c. 
D.91 Capital taxes 
 
The taxes on capital and business income can again be split between those levied on the 
income of corporations and those imposed on the income of households and self-employed. 
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3.2  Results 
Graph VI displays the shares of revenue broken down by economic function in the EU-27. 
Overall the taxes levied on labour income account for around 49% of the total while the share 
of taxes levied on consumption and capital represent respectively 28% and 23%. The share of 
consumption taxes is higher in the Member States that have joined the Union in the last two 
enlargement rounds. On the other hand, Italy, France Belgium and Sweden have low shares of 
consumption taxes.  
The importance of labour taxes is highlighted by the fact that fifteen of the EU Member States 
derive around half their revenue from labour taxes: twelve raise between 48 % and 53 % of 
the total, while Sweden, Germany and Austria obtain more than 55 %. The bottom half of the 
distribution is more dispersed, with Bulgaria raising the least amount of financing from 
labour, a mere 28.5 % of the total.  
The share of revenue yielded by capital taxes is large in the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Malta, Cyprus, Italy and Poland, where they contribute over one quarter 
of total taxes, and noticeably small in the Baltic Republics, Hungary, and Slovenia with less 
than one seventh. As for their composition, taxes raised on capital and business income are 
generally more important than taxes on stocks of capital/wealth; one important exception is 
France, where high taxes on wealth lead to broadly equal proportions between the two types. 
In the recently accessed Member States, these taxes by and large yield a lower share of 
revenue than in the EU-15; this might be linked, however, to a lower aggregate value and 
productivity of the capital stock. 
 
Graph VI - Revenue by economic function 
EU-27 weighted averages, 2006 
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Source: Commission Services 
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The distribution of the overall tax burden by economic function has undergone some 
important changes since the mid-1990s, and the pattern is rather mixed across Member States 
(see Graph VII). On average for the EU-25, an across-the-board – partly cyclically induced – 
increase in capital taxes as a percentage of GDP to the highest levels since 1995 can be 
noticed as well as a slight decline of labour taxes since the late 1990s. Labour taxes have 
indeed significantly increased only in six Member States, while in sixteen others they 
contributed in a non-negligible way to reducing overall taxation. Despite significant changes 
in many Member States, consumption taxes as % of GDP are, on average, at about the same 
level in 2006 as in 1995. 
 
Graph VII – Relative contribution of taxes on labour, capital and consumption to the 
change in the total tax-to-GDP ratio, by country 
1995-2006, in % of GDP 
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Source: Commission Services 
Note: Romania and Bulgaria are not included as no data is available for a substantial part of the time series. 
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4. Implicit tax rates on consumption, labour and capital 
The disaggregation of tax revenues by economic function as a proportion of GDP (or share of 
total taxation) only provides limited information on the real tax burden imposed on 
consumption, labour or capital. One potential reason for a, e.g., relatively high share of labour 
taxes in GDP (or in total taxation) in a Member State could, of course, be high personal 
income tax rates or social contributions. However, high revenues from labour taxes could also 
be due to a relatively large share of labour income in GDP, which again could be a 
consequence of permanently high levels of employment in a Member State or high 
employment levels due to the business cycle. Therefore, so-called implicit tax rates (ITRs) are 
calculated in order to provide better information on the tax burden on an economic activity.  
4.1  Methodology 
ITRs measure the effective average tax burden directly or indirectly levied on different types 
of economic income or activities that could potentially be taxed by Member States. Aggregate 
tax revenues are expressed as a percentage of the potential tax base. ITRs enable a monitoring 
of tax burden levels over time (e.g. to identify so-called tax shifts from one type of economic 
activity to another) and across countries. While the information on the tax revenue is 
calculated by using more detailed tax data than provided in ESA95 (see part 3.1), the 
calculation of the potential tax base follows the ESA95 classification and only involved data 
that is available from the Eurostat database. In this section the ITRs for the different economic 
functions are introduced. The objective is to give an understanding of the key features of the 
ITRs.12  
The ITR on consumption is defined as follows: 
domSP
nconsumptioonTaxesITRC 14_31
=  
All taxes on consumption as defined in section 3.1 are put in relation to the final consumption 
expenditure of households on the economic territory, using the domestic concept 
(P31_S14dom). This implies that the tax base is broader than the legal base applied in the 
Member States. The ITR on consumption not only includes the VAT but also a number of 
other taxes imposed on consumption. In order to provide a more detailed picture, the 
                                                 
12 A more detailed discussion can be found in European Commission (2008a). 
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numerator of the ITR on consumption can be disaggregated into four categories: The VAT 
component, the energy component (which includes excises on motor vehicle fuels), the 
tobacco and alcohol component and a residual. Strictly speaking only the VAT component 
can be regarded as an implicit tax rate. The other components are biased to a certain extent, 
because they are taxes levied on specific goods and thus their tax base is only a small portion 
of the final consumption. Although necessary to obtain an additive breakdown of the ITR, this 
fact should be borne in mind. 
A better insight into the peculiarities of the VAT tax bases in the Member States’ tax systems 
is provided by a specific indicator representing the difference between the generally 
applicable statutory VAT rate (disregarding reduced rates) and the VAT component of the 
ITR on consumption. This indicator, which is called "VAT reduced rate and base indicator", 
aims at giving a snapshot of the extent by which a given VAT system approximates a "pure" 
consumption tax, characterised by a flat rate and the widest possible tax base (i.e. the entire 
value of private consumption without exemptions). A low value of this indicator suggests that 
the VAT tax base approximates the value of private consumption and hence reduced rates and 
VAT exemptions play a minor role, while a high value represents an indication that a 
substantial share of private consumption is spared from taxation at the standard VAT rate. 
Other factors contributing to a high indicator value could also be a high registration threshold 
for VAT, implying taxation of only a share of intermediate consumption and not taxing value 
added by SMEs below the threshold as well as significant levels of VAT evasion or 
avoidance. 
The ITR on labour is only calculated for employed labour. For the calculation all taxes on 
employed labour income (as defined in section 3.1) are put in relation to the sum of the 
compensation of employees (D.1) and wage bill and payroll taxes (D.29c): 
cDD
employedlabouronTaxesITRL 291
)(
+=  
It is important to note that an increase in the ITR on labour can be due to other effects than an 
increase in tax rates or social contributions. High inflation and real growth move employees 
into higher income brackets and therefore lead to an increase in the average tax rates in case 
the brackets are not adjusted for inflation. Cyclical effects therefore can also have an impact 
on the ITR on labour. The ITR on labour can be disaggregated into three component: the PIT 
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component, a component containing the social contributions paid by the employees and one 
including employers' social contributions and payroll taxes. 
In the case of capital, different ITRs can be distinguished: ITR on capital, ITR on capital and 
business income, ITR on corporate income, ITR on capital and business income of 
households. In all cases, the numerator is based on the taxes on capital as defined in section 
3.1. As concerns the denominator, the calculation is much more complex than in the case of 
the ITRs on consumption and labour. It requires the detailed use of ESA95 sectoral accounts 
data.  
The (overall) ITR on capital aims at measuring the average tax burden on capital and is 
'…computed as the ratio between revenue from all capital taxes, and all (in principle) 
potentially taxable capital and business income in the economy…' (European Commission, 
2008a, page 412). It should be interpreted with caution as its trend reflects many different 
factors.  
In very general terms, the (overall) ITR on capital can be defined as follows: 
incomecapitaltaxableypotentiall
incomecapitalonTaxesITRcapital
)(=  
When looking at the overall ITR on capital it has to be born in mind that the numerator 
includes both taxes on capital income and stocks of capital (wealth), whereas the denominator 
only refers to capital income that is included in the system of national accounts. The ITR on 
capital and business income only contains taxes on capital and business income in the 
numerator and has the base with the overall ITR on capital in common. Nevertheless, the 
denominator still deviates from taxable profits. Whereas capital gains are not included in the 
definition of profits in the system of national accounts (as they are not related to the 
production process), they can constitute an important part of taxable profits of (financial) 
companies. This problem also applies to capital gains of households. As a consequence, the 
ITR on capital and business income is overestimated if capital gains are taxed. Moreover, the 
profits of central bank are included in the denominator but in general not in the numernator, 
which leads to an underestimation of the ITR. Another aspect that seems important is the 
aspect of losses. Whereas losses carried forward lead to a reduction of taxable profits and tax 
revenues, they do not have an impact on the net operating surplus in national accounts. This 
leads to a cyclical mismatch with the base and a cyclical fluctuation in the ITR. These aspects 
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sometimes make the trend in the ITR difficult to interpret and have an impact on international 
comparisons. Finally, not only problems in the interpretation have to be faced but also in the 
availability of data needed for its calculation. As a consequence ITRs on capital are not 
available for all EU Member States and for some Member States simplified assumptions have 
to be made in the calculations. 
Nevertheless, the ITRs on capital have the big advantage that they not only looks at statutory 
tax rates and that the base is independent of the tax law applied in the respective Member 
State. It is, however, important to be aware of the drawbacks and limitations when analysing 
their levels in different Member States and the trends over time. 
4.2  Results 
Graph VIII displays the evolution of the three main implicit tax rates, on labour, on 
consumption and capital, between 1995 and 2006. Average effective tax rates on labour 
remain well above those for capital and consumption. Despite political intentions to make 
work pay shared by many governments, the decline in labour taxation stopped in 2005. 
Effective taxation of capital has significantly increased during the period 1995-1999 and 
again since 2003. Finally, since 2001 consumption taxation has been trending upwards 
steadily. More details are provided in the following sections on different aspects of the 
implicit tax rates on consumption, labour and capital. 
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Graph VIII – Development of implicit tax rates 
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Source: Commission Services 
4.2.1 ITR on consumption 
The arithmetic average implicit tax rate on consumption for the EU-25 is 22.1 % for 2006. 
The lowest ITR on consumption throughout the whole Union is for Spain (16.4 %), followed 
by Lithuania (16.7 %), Italy (17.2 %) and Greece (17.6 %). In the high consumption taxing 
countries Denmark stands out with 34.0 %, almost six percentage points above the following 
Member States – Sweden, Finland, Netherlands and Ireland. 
Graph IX displays the disaggregation of the ITR on consumption into four components: VAT, 
energy, tobacco and alcohol as well as residual. While the VAT component is the largest, the 
non-VAT component of the ITR is far from negligible in all Member States: it ranges from 
lows of respectively 27.7 % in Sweden, 29.8 % in Lithuania and 30.0 % in Estonia up to highs 
of 44.5 % for Luxembourg and 45.5 % in Hungary. The variation in the VAT component of 
the ITR, while non-negligible, is not as marked as that registered for the other three. 
The energy tax component, which includes excises on motor vehicle fuels, usually accounts 
for between two and five percentage points, the average being 3.4 points. The lowest values 
are found in Greece and Malta (respectively 1.8 and 1.9 percentage points), while the highest 
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are found in Luxembourg (6.5 points), followed by Sweden (4.9 points), the Czech Republic 
(4.7 points) as well as Denmark and the Netherlands (both 4.6 points). 
Taxation of alcohol and tobacco amounts to, on average, the equivalent of 2.0 percentage 
points. The range of variation is however wide, extending from 1.0 percentage points in the 
Netherlands to 3.8 points in Luxembourg. Other countries where tobacco and alcohol taxes 
raise little income include Italy and Austria (both 1.2 points) whereas in Bulgaria and Poland 
this component accounts for a significant portion of the ITR (3.3 and 3.0 points respectively).  
The residual component in the ITR on consumption not only varies a lot among member 
states in size but is also rather heterogeneous. It is largest in Denmark (6.4 %) and Hungary 
(5.4 %) whereas it is very limited in most of the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. 
Denmark stands out for the great number of additional duties, most of which are also 
pollution and transport taxes. 
Graph IX - Disaggregation of ITR on consumption: 2006 results 
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Source: Commission Services 
Graph X displays results for the VAT reduced rate and base indicator.  In Italy and Poland the 
indicator reaches around 9 percentage points. A major explanation for the high value of the 
indicator for Italy lies in the wide application of the reduced (10 %) and super-reduced (4 %) 
rates; these apply to widely consumed goods and services such as food, transport, books and 
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periodicals, pharmaceuticals, public facilities, hotel accommodation, restaurant services, and 
residential housing; the favourable treatment of housing in particular is likely to have a 
significant impact on revenues. In Poland, as of 2006, the reduced rates are also widely 
applicable and considerably lower: the super-reduced rate is 3 % and the reduced rate 7 %. 
The lowest values (remarkably low at less than 1 percentage point) are attributable to Estonia, 
Cyprus and Luxembourg. As for Luxemburg, the geographical smallness of the territory and 
the significant expenditure by non-residents generally make the interpretation of the ITR 
difficult; revenues from consumption taxes paid by non-residents might therefore be the main 
cause for its low indicator value. Bulgaria, which maintained until recently a VAT account 
system notably to fight tax evasion, also displays a low value in 2006 (around 3 %).13 
Graph X – VAT reduced rate and base indicator 
2006, in percentage points 
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13 Bulgaria introduced a VAT account system in 2003 in order to ensure the virtual VAT payments. All VAT-
registered businesses were required to open a VAT account, which was separated from other business' cash 
flows. 
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4.2.1 ITR on labour 
Making work pay is one of the objectives of the European Employment strategy and reducing 
tax burden on labour feature on many governmental programmes. Hence the interest for a 
comparison of the tax burden on labour in the EU Member States (illustrated in graph XI), an 
analysis of its trends and components. In 2006, the average ITR on labour in the EU-27 
reached 34.8%. Malta (21.5%) and Cyprus (24.8%) stand out as the Member States with the 
lowest ITRs. Ireland and the UK also have much lower than average ITR on labour. On the 
other hand, in most Continental and Nordic Member States the ITRs on labour exceed the 
average. The highest tax burden on labour is reported in Sweden, Italy, Belgium France and 
Finland.   
For the majority of the countries in the Union, social security contributions have a higher 
impact on the level of the ITR than the personal income tax. On average, in 2006 about two 
thirds of the overall ITR on labour consists of non-wage labour costs paid by both employees 
and employers. Only in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom personal income taxes 
account for a relatively large part of the total charges paid on labour income. In Denmark, the 
share of social contributions in government receipts is very low as most welfare spending is 
financed by general taxation14. The relatively low tax burden on labour in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom can largely be explained by the relatively low shares of the social 
contributions in these countries. In Slovakia, Greece, Poland, Romania (2005), and the Czech 
Republic, only about 20 % or less of the ITR on labour consists of personal income tax.  
                                                 
14 A large part of employees' social contributions in Denmark comes from an 8 % contribution paid on the basis 
of employees' gross earnings. Some studies classify this revenue as a social security contribution, while others 
report it as a separate type of personal income tax. 
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Graph XI – Implicit tax rate on labour: decomposition 2006 
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Note: Data for Romania refers to 2005. 
Source: Commission Services 
The ITRs on labour give a picture of the average tax burden on labour across all income 
classes. However, even at an unchanged overall tax level, the burden of taxation may be 
shifted between high- and low income taxpayers. Over the last decade policymakers have 
often resorted to cuts in labour taxes that are targeted to the bottom end of the wage scale in 
order to improve employability of low-skilled workers. To assess movement in this direction, 
it is relevant to compare the evolution of the ITR on labour with that of the tax wedge - i.e. 
the difference between labour costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay 
of the employee.  
The annual OECD publication Taxing Wages, provides internationally comparable data on 
total tax wedges for various household types and different representative wage levels. The tax 
wedges are calculated on the basis of tax legislation in force, by expressing the sum of 
personal income tax, employee's plus employer's social security contributions together with 
any payroll tax, as a percentage of total labour costs. These indicators can theoretically 
identify discretionary tax policy measures as regards personal income tax and social 
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contributions while at the same time excluding the effects of cyclical factors (which are not 
filtered out by the ITRs on labour). Hence, the two approaches are complementary. 
Graph XII - ITR on labour vs. tax wedge: Trend 
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Source: Commission Services, OECD, data from the Structural indicators database – (OECD model). 
Note: The tax wedge refers to a single person without children at 2/3 of average earnings 
Graph XII compares the developments during the period 1996-2006 of the ITR on labour and 
the tax wedge for a single person without children at 2/3 of average earnings. 
Over the 1996-2006 period, the EU average tax burden on labour stabilized and then started to 
slowly decline. This trend is visible in the development of both indicators. However, the 
indicators do not always develop in parallel. Two periods can be distinguished: up to 2000 the 
ITR on labour increased and then remained stable, whereas the tax wedge started to decrease 
markedly already as of 1998. The gap between the two indicators opened up. In the second 
period, from 2001-2005, the two series run roughly parallel, both showing a downward trend. 
Despite changes in single years, the gap overall remained nearly unchanged over these years. 
In 2006, however, the downward trend in the tax wedge continues, whereas in the case of the 
ITR on labour, the average rate somewhat increased. All in all, this suggests that the relatively 
 25 
limited efforts carried out in the EU to decrease the tax burden on labour have benefited more 
to the low wage earners.  
4.2.1 ITR on capital 
Although corporate income tax revenues only account for 9% (arithmetic average) of total tax 
revenues in the EU, the trends affecting this tax more likely to be subject to competition are of 
particular interest.  
Graph XIII displays the developments of the adjusted statutory corporate income tax rates for 
the EU-27, the Euro area, a group of 6 non EU OECD member countries ('OECD-6', 
consisting of Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Norway, United States,) as well as a few 
important emerging countries.  
The average statutory rate has decreased by 11,7 percentage points during the period 1995-
2008.The reduction was almost as important in the Euro Area as in the EU-27 as a whole. The 
trend has continued during the most recent period, as a result in particular of a decrease in the 
rate from 38.7% to 29.8% in Germany and from 37.3% to 31.4% in Italy.   
The decrease of corporate income statutory tax rates has been more pronounced in the EU 
than in other geographical areas. As an example, the average statutory CIT rate of the 'OECD-
6' countries was in 1995 exceeding the future Euro Area average by 0.7 percentage points and 
the EU-27 average by 2.8 points. In 2008, the difference has grown to respectively 6 and 8.9 
percentage points. The average CIT statutory rate of Brazil, Russia, India, and China is in 
2008 above both the Euro area and EU-27 averages.  
 26 
Graph XIII – Adjusted top statutory tax rates on corporate income 
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Source: Commission Services 
Note: Only the basic (non-targeted) top rate is presented. Existing surcharges and averages of local 
taxes are included (see European Commission 2008a, page 88) 
Despite this impressive reduction of statutory tax rates, revenues have reached a peak in the 
EU-27 in 2006, latest year for which data is available. CIT revenues represent 3.3% of GDP 
in the EU-27 and 3.5% in the Euro Area. The influence of the economic cycle appears 
however clearly behind the trends displayed in graph XIV.  
The ratio between corporate income tax revenues and GDP was higher in 2006 than in 1995 
in all Member States except the Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland and 
Slovakia. Member States applying low statutory rates do not always collect low revenues: 
Cyprus and Ireland which applied the lowest rates in 2006 registered higher than average 
revenues. CIT revenues in Cyprus reached 5.5% of GDP, the highest ratio in the EU-27. 
Revenues collected by individual Member States can be affected by specific factors such as 
the importance of profit shifting carried out by multinational companies to take advantage of 
rates differentials. However, the diverging trends of rates and revenues at the level of the EU 
as a whole has become a paradox, subject of growing economic research.   
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Using Taxation Trends data, Piotrowska and Vanborren (2008) have shown that 
corporatization (defined as the increase of the ratio between corporate income and business 
income) has contributed to maintain the level of CIT revenues in a context of decreasing 
statutory rates partly offset by tax base broadening. De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) also 
demonstrate that the simultaneous decline in corporate tax rates and rising corporate tax-to-
GDP ratios in Europe may to a large extent be explained by growing corporatization and 
income shifting from personal to corporate income tax. 
 
Graph XIV – Corporate income tax revenues 
arithmetic averages, % of GDP 
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Source: Commission Services 
As illustrated in graph XV, the increase in tax burden on capital in the EU has affected both 
corporations and households. The ITR on capital and business income for the EU-25 rose 
from 17% in 1995 to 22.4% in 2006. The ITRs for corporations and for households have 
increased respectively from 20.6% to 28.6% and from 12.1% to 16.2%.  
The ITRs on capital have however not increased in all Member Sates: the ITR on capital and 
business income has significantly decreased in Estonia and Slovakia, as a result of a strong 
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reduction of the tax burden on corporate income rather than on the capital and business 
income of households and self employed. 
Graph XV – Implicit tax rates on capital and business income 
1995-2006, EU-25, weighted averages, in % 
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Source: Commission Services 
5. Conclusion and ideas for further research 
Comparable statistics for international comparisons of the tax burden are very important for 
policy analysis. A lot has been done in recent years to overcome methodological difficulties in 
order to construct reliable measures for the overall tax burden and for the tax burden for the 
different economic functions. Due to the European System of National and Regional 
Accounts ESA95 and the additional methodology developed for the report 'Taxation trends in 
the European Union' the tools needed are now available.  
Data available for the 1995-2006 period show that Member States have been by and large able 
to maintain the level of overall tax revenues despite an increasingly globalised environment.  
The enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 resulted in an increased diversity 
within the Union. A wide dispersion of more than 20 percentage points of GDP can be 
observed for the overall tax-to-GDP ratio within the European Union. This signals that 
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Member States still seem to have room for manoeuvre to implement different kinds of tax 
policies. This also refers to the structure by type of tax and the tax burden imposed on the 
different economic functions.  
Given the big divergence observed for the EU Member States, it would be interesting to 
evaluate in how far a convergence or divergence of the overall tax burden and the main other 
indicators discussed can be observed in the European Union. Two convergence indicators are 
already included in European Commission (2008a), the 'Standard deviation/mean' indicator 
and the 'Max-Min' indicator. So far, however, they are only used to a limited extent in the 
publication. Given the importance, the topic seems to merit a more in depth analysis. 
Another interesting question for future research would be to try to disentangle the different 
effects that influence the ITRs. Are changes in the level due to the changes in the tax 
legislation, fiscal drag or the business cycle? Such an analysis already exists for the overall 
tax burden15 and the main tax aggregates of part of the Member States. While interest for 
extending the approach to the ITRs has already been expressed, the complexity of the exercise 
should not be underestimated.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 See Kremer et al. (2006) and Bouthevillain et al. (2001). 
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Annex 
Scheme of ESA95 classification of taxes and social contributions 
 
D.2 Taxes on Production and Imports 
       D.21      Taxes on Products 
            D.211           Value added type taxes 
            D.212           Taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT 
                D.2121                 Import duties 
                D.2122                 Taxes on imports, excluding VAT and import duties 
                    D.2122a                        Levies on imported agricultural products 
                    D.2122b                        Monetary compensatory amounts on imports 
                    D.2122c                        Excise duties 
                    D.2122d                        General sales taxes 
                    D.2122e                        Taxes on specific services 
                    D.2122f                        Profits of import monopolies 
         D.214           Taxes on products, except VAT and import taxes 
                D.214a                   Excise duties and consumption taxes 
                D.214b                   Stamp taxes 
                D.214c                   Taxes on financial and capital transactions 
                D.214d                   Car registration taxes 
                D.214e                   Taxes on entertainment 
                D.214f                   Taxes on lotteries, gambling and betting 
                D.214g                   Taxes on insurance premiums 
                D.214h                   Other taxes on specific services 
                D.214i                    General sales or turnover taxes 
                D.214j                    Profits of fiscal monopolies 
                D.214k                   Export duties and monetary comp. amounts on exports 
                D.214l                   Other taxes on products n.e.c. 
       D.29      Other taxes on production 
            D.29a           Taxes on land, buildings and other structures 
            D.29b           Taxes on the use of fixed assets 
            D.29c           Total wage bill and payroll taxes 
            D.29d           Taxes on international transactions 
            D.29e           Business and professional licences 
            D.29f           Taxes on pollution 
            D.29g           Under-compensation of VAT (flat rate system) 
            D.29h           Other taxes on production n.e.c. 
    
D.5 Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 
       D.51      Taxes on income 
            D.51a+D.51c1           Taxes on individual or household income incl. holding gains 
            D.51b+D.51c2          Taxes on the income or profits of corporations incl. holding 
gains 
            D.51c3           Other taxes on holding gains 
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            D.51d           Taxes on winnings from lottery or gambling 
            D.51e           Other taxes on income n.e.c. 
       D.59      Other current taxes 
            D.59a           Current taxes on capital 
            D.59b           Poll taxes 
            D.59c           Expenditure taxes 
            D.59d           Payments by households for licences 
            D.59e           Taxes on international transactions 
            D.59f           Other current taxes n.e.c. 
    
D.91 Capital taxes 
       D.91a      Taxes on capital transfers 
       D.91b      Capital levies 
       D.91c      Other capital taxes n.e.c. 
    
D.611 Actual social contributions 
       D.6111      Employers' actual social contributions 
            D.61111           Compulsory employers' actual social contributions 
            D.61112*           Voluntary employers' actual social contributions* 
       D.6112      Employees'  social contributions 
            D.61121           Compulsory employees'  social contributions 
            D.61122*           Voluntary employees'  social contributions* 
       D.6113      Social contributions by self- and non-employed persons 
            D.61131           Compulsory contributions self- and non-employed persons 
            D.61132*           Voluntary contributions by self and non-employed persons* 
D.612* Imputed social contributions* 
    
 
* not included in the definition of total taxes used in the paper 
 
Source: Commission Services 
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